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Abstract 
The development of a counter-insurgency doctrine is an evolutionary process: no two insurgencies are the 
same. However, certain fundamental principals remain consistent and these can be applied to meet the required 
circumstances. The creation of an overarching plan encompassing a combination of military, political and 
social actions under the strong control of a single authority is central. Therefore, understanding the basics 
allows for the development of a tactical strategy based upon a structured plan. Compiling the ‘Plan’ should be 
based upon the lessons learnt from the past. To this end, the methodology used is supported by a literature 
review and interviews from participants in a limited assessment of the two historical conflicts: Malaya and 
Kenya.  
 
Based upon the findings, a condensed table is presented to aid analysis, using a French doctrinal approach as a 
tool for interpretation. In addition, this is supported by quotes from the respondents involved in the research 
process. These findings are the preliminary results of a research study looking at what was effective during the 
prosecution of the selected insurgencies. Outcomes indicate that the fundamental principals are pertinent today 
and are therefore generally applicable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper presents the partial results from two case studies: Kenya and Malaya dealing with counter-
insurgency. The paper forms part of a much larger study that looks at three case studies, including the 
Rhodesian Bush War, in an effort to understand what were the key elements involved in prosecuting an effective 
counter-insurgency campaign. A preliminary finding has been how important it is to have a defined ‘Plan’ that 
encompasses all aspects required to achieve this objective. The combined approach is recommended by Galula 
(1964); his synopsis is that counter–insurgency is a combination of military, political and social actions under a 
strong control of a single authority. 
 
What stands out in approach taken by the British Government in Malaya was the use of this composite strategy 
combining the civil authorities with the police, military and intelligence under a determined rule of law whilst 
enticing the population through welfare programmes. The carrot was independence, through gradual local self 
government thus undermining any promises the Communist insurgents might make. A series of structure 
measures were progressively introduced to support the strategic plan. An assessment of the key elements is 
presented based upon the research. 
METHODOLOGY 
 
A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted, transcribed and then coded for the study. The coding 
was primarily based upon the themes identified by the literature review. However, a further series of codes were 
developed to cover any new avenues of research that were brought out from the narratives of the interviews, 
“noticing relevant phenomena; collecting examples of those phenomena; and analysing those phenomena in 
order to find commonalities, differences, patterns and structures.” By employing this method a researcher is able 
to question, evaluate and balance the data with a view to developing a further usable data,  “drop categories and 
to make a hierarchical order” (Basit, 2003, p. 144). Although, as pointed out by Basit, this cannot be created “in 
in isolation from the other categories we want to use in the analysis” (p. 144). Therefore, any new codes used 




Based upon the finding thus far, a Table 1.1 has been produced that has been condensed into a summary. A 
limited comparative analysis is presented based upon these incomplete results, as a further case study involving 
Rhodesia needs to be added to complete the research study. However, a comparison between the two conflicts 
shows up similarities and trends capable of being adopted elsewhere.  
 
Element Malaya Kenya 
 Administration Part of combined strategy Held sway over decision process 
 Aircraft Bombing used but halted Bombing but not effective 
 Dogs Limited use by army/ not by police Large use of dogs by police/army 
 Emergency Powers Issued in 1948/draconian Issued in 1952/draconian 
 Food control Yes, harsh/strict imposition Limited but used effectively 
 French lessons Oil spot used and pop control Pop control, sweeps/ detentions 
 Hearts and Minds Developed successfully  Limited and not generally known 
 Home Guard Vital part of overall strategy Vital part of overall strategy 
 Indigenous forces Used in police/ army/home guard Used in police/ army/home guard 
 Insurgents Predominately Chinese communist Predominately Kikuyu tribe 
 Intelligence Became very effective/monetary bribes Limited and patchy/ informers used 
 Language Major problem/ few Chinese speakers Few Kikuyu but many Swahili speakers 
 Legislation Extensive and draconian Extensive and draconian 
 Martial Law Never imposed/ Emergency powers Never Imposed/Emergency powers 
 Mechanisms Over-arching supremo No overarching supremo 
 Mounted units Not used but Mules for transport were Both the Police and KR used effectively 
 Notable actors Templer/Briggs/Catling/Young Erskine/ Kitson/ Henderson/Catling 
 Plan Briggs Plan/ an overall blue print Series of semi-interrelated plans 
 Oaths and sorcery Chinese religion and Triad control Main aspect of Mau Mau/de-oathing 
 Organisation Poor at first then highly successful Poor becoming moderately successful 
 Police Poor at first then highly successful Poor at first then highly successful 
 Population Part of overall strategy Part of overall strategy 
 Propaganda Comprehensive/effective Limited and piecemeal 
 Pseudo gangs Limited/ used near the end of conflict Highly successful/used from '53 
 Psychological operations Very successful/comprehensive Limited success/limited 
 Public works Used extensively to support Plan Limited use but accelerated later 
 Reasons for conflict Communism/colonialism Land issues/ tribalism/Colonialism 
 Restricted areas Security areas/ enforced Prohibited & special areas/ enforced 
 Roads Used to infiltrate the jungle Used to infiltrate the forests 
 Special Branch Poor at first then highly successful Poor at first then moderately successful 
 Special units SAS, Jungle squads, Ghurkhas Combat tracker units/Pseudos/GSU 
 Spotter planes Used but not effective without infrared Became very effective, but limited 
 Strategy Developed through central Plan Loosely held together/no central Plan 
 Structure of forces Colonial forces with British army units Colonial forces with British army units 
 Villages Developed successfully/ Briggs Plan Used /limited success/hostility 
 
Table 1.1 Core elements of counter-insurgency in Malaya and Kenya 
 
The elements presented in the Table 1.1 have been identified as key to the overall prosecution of the conflict. A 
cursory examination indicates how complex, diverse and intricate are the aspects that need to be considered 
when building a counter-insurgency strategy. For the purposes of this paper, only a limited selection can be dealt 
with, therefore an explanation of how strategy is formulated follows, primarily based upon a French 
interpretation of counter-insurgency doctrine. The other observation is how similar the elements are, as effective 
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tactics were transferred between the two conflicts. In addition, there were notable actors who were very 
influential to the conflicts.  
COUNTER-INSURGENCY 
 
The strategy, factors and roles to combat armed conflict can be summed up by the term ‘counter-insurgency’, 
which involves all the means available to accomplish success including repression, intimidation, reprisals, 
coercion, destruction and death (Beckett, 2001, pp. 26-43; Joes, 2004, pp. 233-246; Taber, 1970). As an 
evolving model, this has taken on many guises as it has developed over the years, which always need to be 
defined in relation to the period of study. Hence, “an effective counterinsurgency (sic) program depends on an 
accurate, substantive, and comprehensive profile of the adversary and the environmental context within which 
he operates”(O'Neill, 2005, p. 155).  
 
“It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred 
battles”(Tzu, 2011/ 6th Century BC, p. 14 ch III).  
 
Therefore, the fundamental starting point in preparing a counter-insurgency strategy must be who are your foes? 
Building up a clear understanding of the insurgents’ aims and objectives unpinned by a clear appreciation as to 
where they are getting their support and how is a basic requirement? Conversely, this is not as easy as it sounds, 
as it requires a substantial and comprehensive intelligence capability to build up the picture. Generalising at this 
early stage is fraught with problems and errors are costly. Unfortunately, this was the case in Malaya, the 
authorities ignored the early warnings and their initial actions were inept and fumbling allowing a large section 
of the Communist insurgents to escape capture by heading into the deep jungle (Carruthers, 1995, p. 74). 
Similarly in Kenya, the Kikuyu rebels who formed the Mau Mau, were not taken seriously at first and this 
stalled an effective counter-insurgency plan from being developed. Although a net was cast arresting what was 
thought to be the core protagonists in operation ‘Jock Scott’, this was found to have missed the active organisers 
of the Mau Mau (Parker, 2009, p. 142). 
 
The process of developing a counter-insurgency strategy requires identification of the goals of the insurgents as 
well, as this will assist in developing ways to frustrate their aims. This important aspect appears not to have been 
clear at the start of the Emergencies in both Kenya and Malaya. Four major works of the time, point out this 
requirement in their methodologies for dealing with insurgencies by stressing the need to understand the aims of 
the insurgents (Galula, 1964; McCuen, 1966; Paget, 1967; Thompson, 1966). However, as Strachan (2007) 
points out, strategy was evolving very quickly through necessity, as the British learnt the heavy lessons from the 
brutal campaign in Palestine, 1946 to 1948, and then tried to apply them to Emergencies in both Kenya and 
Malaya. Palestine policemen were recruited directly to the colonial forces in both countries, to supplement the 
limited local police in 1948; as soon as they were de-mobbed (p. 9). Those men who had experience in dealing 
with terrorist activities were in particular demand (Jones, 1948).  
BASIC UNDERLYING PRINCIPALS 
 
Four works by Galula (1964), McCuen (1966), Paget (1967) and Thompson (1966) , all attest to the necessity of 
constructing a strategic plan based upon the nature of the insurgency. The initiative should lie with the 
recognised government and not the insurgents. Galula’s (1964) approach centres upon his theory that 
counterinsurgency is not solely military, but a combination of military, political and social actions under the 
strong control of a single authority. The four basic rules that he puts forward, form the strategies for most of the 
operations that have followed across the globe, in one form or another:- 
 
1. The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent. 
2. Support is gained through an active minority. 
3. Support from the population is conditional. 
4. Intensity of Efforts and vastness of means are essential (pp. 52-55). 
Population is central to the whole effort. Furthermore, interpretation of these laws indicates the aim of counter-
insurgency is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory. The majority of the population 
will try to remain neutral in the conflict; from bitter experience they know being on the wrong side can mean 
death. The fear of retribution remains constant amongst the population. They will only give their support to the 
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government if they know they will be protected, this support is fickle and quickly lost if they see any sign of 
weakness or resolve. Achieving order and support of the population can only be done by progressively removing 
armed opponents from the district; thus securing the area. Building infrastructure and strengthening positions 
will assist in creating long-term relationships with the population; this must be done area by area (Artelli, 2007; 
Galula, 1964). 
 
When assessing how the British government dealt with the conflicts in both Malaya and Kenya when they 
started, it appears as if there was little coordination or structure to their counter-insurgency efforts. It was not 
until Lt-General Sir Harold Briggs was appointed Director of Operations in 1950 did any structure become 
apparent to produce an overall plan. The Plan became known as the Briggs Plan (1950) for Malaya, followed by 
the one developed later by Erskine in Kenya (1953); loosely based upon the same principals. Briggs sought to 
cut off the supplies to the insurgents by a series of measures, one of which was building new villages to keep the 
inhabitants away from being intimidated or supporting the rebels (Hack, 2009, pp. 387-388).  
CREATING A PLAN 
 
Appointing General Briggs as an over-all supremo and Director of Operations in 1950 with executive “authority 
over all the security forces-army, police and air force-and the power to coordinate actions of civil departments 
that affected the war”, was one of the most important actions taken to ensure that every one pulled together 
(Clutterbuck, 1966, pp. 56-57). Briggs developed his ‘Plan’, which became the blue print for prosecuting the 
counter-insurgency efforts against the Communist Terrorists (CT’s). But it was General Templar that ensured 
the ‘Plan’ was carried through (Cloake, 1985 ch 9 ). 
 
Galula (1964) lays out the framework for conducting a counter-insurgency operation and lists six principles. The 
first of these is to seize the initiative and become offensive (p. 82) The second is the “full utilization of the 
counterinsurgent’s assets” (1964, p. 57), by which he includes all resources available to the nation: economic, 
administrative, judicial, military and police, control of the information and the political element too. Third, is 
economy of force, which in colonial terms was taken to mean both being thrifty, as fighting in the colonies was 
expensive and also not to wipe out the local population either; as this could prove counter-productive (1964, p. 
56). The fourth, is the concept of irreversibility, which means defending the ground gained and not to cede this 
back to the insurgents. It is this principle that underpins the whole strategy; as once ground is gained, this goes a 
long way to convincing the population that the government forces are winning.  Once this conviction is accepted 
then superior intelligence comes forth from the local population, as they recognise it is in their best interests not 
to allow the insurgents to return; the fear of retribution if they did becomes too great. The fifth concept 
sequentially follows, “to command is to control” (1964, p. 85). 
  
The first principle deals with selecting the areas to concentrate on before moving to other areas, focusing 
“enough forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents” first (Galula, p. 55). In both Malaya 
and Kenya the creation of a Home Guard supported by a Special Constabulary and augmented by a large 
number of trained police men from Palestine further allowed this strategy to come about (Miller, 1972, p. 41). 
 
Once the forces available had been achieved it was possible to secure the areas cleared and ensured the rebels 
did not return. Furthermore, cutting the support for the insurgents meant restricting the movement of the 
population, which was done by placing them progressively into fortified villages. Further draconian measures 
required issuing everyone with identification cards, applying strict curfews, extending the powers of arrest, 
search and detention with the death penalty for possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives.  The rule of 
law provided for a fair trial, which is the principal difference from martial law (Ghows, 2006, pp. 38-39). 
 
The Briggs plan in Malaya sought to ensure that the population not only took an active part in their own 
defence, thus adhering to the second law proposed by Galula, but also devised a vast strategy to keep the 
insurgents away from their sources of sustenance; both physical and ideological. The construction of ‘New 
Villages’, which housed over half a million Chinese keeping them safe and secure from intimidation as well as 
proving them with welfare services; was fundamental to this approach (Ucko, 2010, p. 16). Improved 
administration, economic management and education were further tools to aid this process (Rid, 2010, p. 750). 
Kenya adopted the protected ‘Villages’ concept as part of the Emergency Regulations, which were brought in 
between January and April 1953.  
 
These included provisions for communal punishment, curfews, the control of the individual and mass 
movements of people, the confiscation of property and land, the imposition of special taxes, the issuance of 
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special documentation and passes, the censorship and banning of publications, the disbanding of all African 
political organisations, the control and disposition of labor (sic), the suspension of due process, and detention 
without trial. (Elkins, 2005, p. 55) 
 
“Detention without trial was a controversial, but widely practised by the Government” with between 76,000 and 
80,000 detained; as it was reminiscent of concentration camps used by the British in the Boer War (Parker, 
2009, p. 174). In addition to detention, was cutting the rebel forces off from their support base and preventing 
them from terrorising others; this was called ‘villagisation’ or protected villages. The extended settlements were 
all brought together in to a fortified protected village. “By October 1955 more than a million people had been 
concentrated into 854 villages” (Orrù, 1989, p. 366). KENA-P-2 explains how this was done,  
--This was villagisation. The idea was to protect the villagers. When the villagers were in 
the reserve, scattered all over the place, one hut there, another hut there, they were very 
vulnerable to attack by Mau Mau. Now the Mau Mau had to capture the minds of their own 
people. The idea was to herd them together into villages where they would be protected and 
safe at night. By day they could go back to their plots and work their plots, but by night 
they were protected, they were in a palisade, they had look out posts, protected by Home 
Guard. That was the idea. (KENA-P-2; 09/05/2010) 
The programme of villagisation was not without its problems; especially amongst a tribe that was already 
disgruntled by issues of land in the first place. It could easily have turned those that were supportive of the 
Government against them, 
--It wasn’t popular certainly but that raises another story. Having been brought into villages 
they then had reasonable central medical attention, primary schools and things for the kids, 
and better administration and that led in turn to land consolidation program. It might have 
come from Malaya, I don't know. (KENA-P-7; 05/02/2011) 
Herding together disparate members of the tribe was certainly not popular, especially as their land was taken 
and property looted by the Kikuyu Home Guard; who were used to contain them in 850 fortified villages 
(Brendon, 2007, p. 564). Nonetheless as has been argued by Bennett (2007), it may well have been unpopular 
but in the end it was central to effectiveness of the combined strategy and increased the amount of intelligence 
gained (pp. 147-148). Furthermore, it has been propounded by Berman (1989) that it became a valuable tool of 
the administration in the reconstruction of Kikuyu society around a stable consolidation of land, recognising 
individual land rights (pp. 366-367). 
 
The strategy behind the Villagisation process was to cut the supplies off from the insurgents in the forests. 
Restricting access to food was central to this objective. General Erskine in Kenya cleared the areas around the 
forests of crops, bananas and sugar cane, extending roads for greater access as well as building a fosse around 
the fringes. Harsh collective punishments were inflicted on those that contravened the regulations. There was 
also detention for any suspects considered to be Mau Mau. The rule of law required that they be prosecuted, but 
until they could bring the large numbers to court and face trail they were detained pending their appearance in 
court (Brendon, 2007, p. 564).  
SUMMARY  
 
The general interpretation gleaned from these findings appears to be how much more piecemeal the approach to 
counter-insurgency was in Kenya when compared to Malaya, even though the insurgents were geographically 
contained in a relatively determined area and not receiving external support. It still took the authorities ten years 
to bring insurgency under control. What was at fault was a lack of a defined Plan until General Erskine took 
control; although even then he was not given carte blanche, which hampered the mopping up operations. 
 
The overall plan must be the summary of the strategy to accomplish stability of three key factors: control, 
morale and supply. Each of these factors contributes to a sense of well being which is reflected in support for the 
over objective of the government; a return to a stable, viable and confident country, no longer living in fear or 
repression. If it is to succeed, that means it must demonstrate it can win (Thompson, 1966, p. 69).  
 
The plan incorporated much of what was a basic structure for dealing with insurrections used by the French. 
What was different was bringing over all control under the central coordinated counter-insurgency structure 
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with a military man at the head as part of the strategy to manage the conflict. Only when in 1952 General 
Templer, was appointed as High Commissioner and Director of Operations in Malaya with full authority over 
the civilian and military resources did the British recognise the advantages this structure would have to the 
prosecution of the conflict (Hack, 2009, p. 387). 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although the evolution of warfare, including counter-insurgency, has required the use of new technologies to 
compete and defeat the enemy, the fundamental principals remain consistent today (Artelli & Deckro, 2008, p. 
228). Fuller (1916) made similar observations almost a century ago “ the correct application of principals to 
circumstances is the outcome of sound military knowledge built up by study and practice” (p. 1). Nothing has 
changed; therefore the application of the principals to the situation is where the difficulty lies. The adage “no 
need to reinvent the wheel” applies not only to modern warfare and insurgency but also to counter-terrorism. 
The French military theorists laid out a model, which should form the basis of each plan. Whilst this process has 
been adopted by many more military theorists, particularly in the US, by Aspin (1993) and Patraeus (2006), it 
should be possible to incorporate the fundamentals into each strategy. 
 
The population are the key fundamental to all aspects of strategy and central to any counter-insurgency plan. 
Until their support can be assured, then no amount of military intervention will prevail, as their loyalty will 
always return to where they perceive their best long term interests to lie. Protecting them from intimidation is as 
important as not allowing the insurgents to feed off their support and succour. The ‘Villagisation’ strategy 
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